Theory on the GrayLine Tour by Heuvel, Michael Vanden
Fall 2001 137 
Theory on the GrayLine Tour 
Michael Vanden Heuvel 
I thought a lead-in essay would be useful to sketch some issues and a possible 
historical narrative to the philosophy and theory debate, anticipating that it might 
operate as both a point of reference and as a model to be elaborated, contested, and 
adapted to other approaches. Thus, I present here what I tell my theory students is 
the "GrayLine Tour" of an important strand in the philosophy theory relationship, 
which can be used to understand some of what's at stake when we align theory 
and/or philosophy with theatre. As well, I use this overview for two more specific 
reasons: first, because I want to activate, or re-activate, a critical engagement with 
theatre in all its textual, historical, and performative manifestations that to my 
mind encompasses theatre scholarship. This I think can only be accomplished when 
accompanied by an historical overview that traces the transformation of philosophy 
into critical theory. Secondly, I present what follows as a means to encourage 
students to see that every element of production—from acting to design to directing 
or authoring a play—is necessarily fraught with existential, one can even say 
philosophical, dimensions: that, as Herbert Blau used to say, "in every act of theatre 
there is already theory." 
But why not just as well say that theatre is always a manifestation of 
philosophy? My own answer is perhaps best couched in a distinction common to 
scientific inquiry, that is, between scientific theory and scientific law. I don't imagine 
I 'm alone in having experienced a typical initial confusion when a student confronts 
the use of theory in theatre studies by stating flatly, "Well, it all sounds wonderful, 
but it only applies to specific plays or performance modes (or acting styles or 
design vocabularies, etc.)." The assumption behind the response is that "theory" 
means an explanatory model that manifests a certain transcendental applicability. 
But in science this is certainly not the meaning of "theory," where it designates a 
model by which one may work toward achieving any number of goals, only one of 
which may be a scientific law. As a mode of hermeneutics, theory is always 
speculative and rarely granted the status of a transcendental law. The current debates 
in the U.S. over the status of Darwinian theory ("if it's not a law, then it's not 
absolutely true, so there's still room for creationism") dramatize the continuing 
uncertainty of the terms both in scientific discourse and in cultural exchange. 
Philosophy, I would venture, is a form of speculative thought, which—for 
historical reasons—acquires transcendental status (this is obviously truer of some 
philosophical inquiry than of others, most notably metaphysics). Rooted deeply in 
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the idealist mode of Greek thought, Western philosophy comes to mean theories 
that achieve the status of laws because their source lies in an ineffable region 
where variation, distortion and change cannot take place. Thus, in a complex 
history far beyond the scope of this essay, theory and philosophy are allowed to 
inhabit one another and come to mean essentially the same thing for a long stretch 
of Western history. 
That this all changes in the modern period is a bit of a truism, but as with all 
truisms it has an interesting history which is relevant to the topic of theory and 
philosophy as they relate to theatre studies. And, while there's little point in trying 
to divine the exact origins of the shift, one could do worse than to locate its epicenter 
in the work of the Frankfurt School's early critiques. I have in mind especially 
Max Horkheimer's 1937 essay "Traditional and Critical Philosophy," which not 
only proposes a distinction between philosophy and theory, but also provides the 
appropriate methodology for locating that difference and a genealogical inquiry 
for interpreting it. Treating both terms historically rather than as immanent, 
Horkheimer both continues but also writes through and beyond the Enlightenment 
legacy and announces not only the difference between theory and philosophy, but 
as well the necessary victory of the former over the latter in the project of 
emancipation. 
Now, there's little that's new in Horkheimer's notion that what distinguishes 
theory from philosophy are the respective functions of the two: philosophy is turned 
rigorously toward metaphysics while theory bends its gaze toward the social. 
Consequently, one devotes itself to pure speculation while the other proposes to 
cross over from theory to praxis, with all the attendant imperfections this implies. 
Such a response, by itself, would simply continue to render the terms as binary 
opposites, to the point one might rename Raphael's great paean to humanist 
philosophy in the Vatican "The School of Philosophy v. Theory." Alas, simply 
anointing Plato the metaphysician to Aristotle's materialist sociologist is not 
supported. Plato consistently, but especially in the Republic, treats philosophy as 
a mode of thinking that must produce action which has the power to emancipate 
individuals and communities within the material and social realm. The Allegory of 
the Cave is best understood, in fact, not simply as a purely Utopian speculation on 
the ascent of the intellect and soul, but also as a mode of praxis which uses 
philosophy as the source of human liberation. In this regard Plato is already speaking 
in the rhetoric of the Enlightenment and in its theory-making terms. 
However, the Allegory also strongly conveys the probable degenerative effects 
of the individual's liberation from slavery, and it is here that Plato's philosophy 
can be said to stop short of a truly modern notion of theory. Given that, in Plato's 
view, the emancipated individual would be seen as demented, demonic and 
subversive, and given that those remaining enslaved in the cave would be incapable 
of projecting a vision of freedom, the only alternatives available would be to 
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compromise seriously the vision of liberation that might be brought back to those 
still in chains, or else to force the unenlightened to become free. The forms in 
which such re-education would be suffered—banning all but the young and 
submitting even those to a rigorous course of indoctrination—are of course 
autocratic and doomed to failure or compromise. In a sense, then, Plato must 
simply ignore the philosophy/theory relationship because he has painted himself 
into an idealist corner in which theory is always already the sign of imperfection 
and compromise, the falling away from the idealities of philosophy and into the 
dirty work of transforming the very realities to which they are to be applied. 
Still, as David Ingram writes, "It would be wrong to read the Republic as a 
gloss on the futility of philosophical idealism. What it tells us about philosophy 
and enlightenment, generally, is that the ideal demands of transcendent moral reason 
which emancipates us from the bonds of false social reality have to make their 
peace with this reality."1 The means to achieve such peace become available only 
as the location of such transcendent reason could be shifted from God to man. 
With Descartes there emerges a form of rationalism that seems to locate transcendent 
reason securely in subjective consciousness, and yet which at the same time holds 
out that such innate reason resides in the corporeal mind. This becomes historically 
quite important, as it allows very different theories to claim the same philosophical 
basis. For instance, those who read Descartes and choose not to emphasize the 
corporeality of reason may justifiably claim that reason is an essence that transcends 
time and space, and that rational actions proceed directly from the individual in the 
same pure and unmediated way by which mathematical proofs enter the world. If 
it is possible to argue that the true, the good and the beautiful can be grasped 
purely by subjective consciousness, then there is no need for an external entity to 
intervene and adjust or mediate those rational inclinations. On the other hand, if 
the corporeality of consciousness is given due weight, if "brain" is factored into 
the notion of mind, then reason itself is a kind of material substance and therefore 
susceptible to deterministic laws (especially temporal laws that must account for 
changes, transformations, and decay) as well as to material social practices which 
might equally be responsible for altering consciousness. In the latter version, reason 
is thus transcendent but also subject to influences which must be accounted for 
when rational practices are exercised in the real world. Descartes thus opens up 
forms of rationalism compatible to both Protestant laissez-faire capitalism (as well 
as the rampant individualism endorsed by the free and unmediated expression of 
acquisitive reason) and to the foundational Lockean ideas of the social contract 
and natural law. Cartesian rationalism, a servant of two masters, opens up the 
divide that will in the modern period oppose philosophy and theory in ways that 
finally become, in the eyes of the Frankfurt School's critique, incompatible. But 
for Horkheimer to make the implicit claim that theory has surpassed philosophy 
required that he confront Kant's great breakthrough into "critical philosophy," as 
140 Journal of Dramatic Theory and Criticism 
well as its own limitations. Kant's critique of reason rested on the remarkable 
claim, and the crisis of rationality that it called into being, that reason does not in 
any simple manner correspond to reality. 
Further, Kant argues that reality cannot be said to exist prior to consciousness, 
in the sense that an object may precede the mind that perceives it, the latter of 
which then attempts to render exact representations of them into a manifold that 
corresponds to reality. Proposing instead that the function of consciousness was to 
"legislate" the real, Kant derives the notion of a transcendental reason in which the 
mind is pre-wired to process all experience into a unified space-time continuum. 
Important in this regard is Kant's understanding that, given the corresponding loss 
of metaphysical knowledge that proceeds from fallible human consciousness now 
constituting an approximate version of the unified continuum, what must emerge 
is a heightened capacity for moral knowledge and action—that is, praxis. Humans, 
rather than anterior metaphysical ideals, become the ultimate source for values 
and the practices that create and maintain them. The famous categorical imperative 
dictates, in Ingram's words, that "to the extent we allow external authority, bodily 
desire, or unconscious prejudice to causally influence our behavior, we are neither 
fully free nor fully moral" (10). What makes for rational and moral action, in 
Kant's terms, is that one learns to step away from metaphysical ideals and turn 
toward understanding and theorizing how one may de-objectify the natural and 
social world and then to actively legislate it in accord with the dictates of 
transcendental reason. 
Had Kant's imperative been couched in historical, rather than transcendent, 
terms, then the tale might well end here and Horkheimer would have seen little 
purpose in distinguishing between traditional and critical theory. But Kant's critical 
philosophy maintains, as the term indicates, traces of the idealism on which 
philosophy since Plato has been based. It would be Kant's German interpreters— 
Hegel and especially Marx—who would lay the groundwork for transforming 
critical philosophy into critical theory. By virtue of his dialectical methods, Hegel 
could posit that consciousness and "soul" come into being and then evolve through 
the twin contexts of labor and social interaction, altering the now transcendent-
less reason to the extent that by dialectical interaction of labor and society alone, 
history itself is transformed—and always toward the goals of purer reason and 
greater freedom. That Hegel could satisfy himself that the liberal monarchies of 
Europe and, especially, Prussia signaled the closure of this dialectic revealed how 
such an evolutionary view of reason could still serve conservative ends. It is Marx's 
signal transformation of Hegelian ideas into "ideological manifestations of real 
socio-economic forces" that lead, eventually, to the true split between philosophy 
and critical theory and which amounts, in Ingram's words, "to transforming 
philosophy into social science" (18). 
Once philosophy is thus transformed it can never, according to Horkheimer, 
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regain its stature: it must always serve the greater purpose of informing theory 
which, itself, while never achieving the status of law (in the scientific sense), can 
nevertheless activate praxis. When I reach this point with my students, we have 
something of a rudimentary historical narrative by which to address questions 
germane to theatre studies. The application of the model to specific cases is often 
gloriously inelegant, as is the process of scientific research, but often quite creative. 
In terms of acting theory, the nature of linguistic as well as visual texts, the nature 
of audience reception, the phenomenology of the theatrical event, and so on (to 
name only a few), this "brief history of time" as it affects the dynamic relationship 
between theory and philosophy. 
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